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Private Enterprise, Public Good? 
Communications Deregulation as a 
National Political Issue, 1839-1851 
In June 1847, Supreme Court Justice Levi Woodbury delivered a remarkable 
paean to the regulatory powers of the federal government. "To dream," Wood-
bury declared, that the Post Office Department might be supplanted by "indi-
vidual enterprise" was to "dream as wildly as in the tales of the Arabian Nights." 
Private enterprise might conceivably meet the needs of a compact territory that 
was densely settled and bustling with commercial activity: "But what could it do 
for the county of Coos, or Tioga, or for Iowa, and Florida, and Oregon?" 1 
Woodbury's remarks had been occasioned by one of the many lawsuits in the 
mid-184os that pitted the federal government against a parcel delivery company. 
Beginning around 1 840, these companies, known popularly as private expresses, 
challenged the various legal restrictions on private mail delivery by providing 
postal patrons with a low-cost alternative to the Post Office Department on 
many lucrative routes in New England and the mid-Atlantic states. 
Supporters of the private expresses included David Hale and Gerald Hallock, 
the editors of the influential New York journal of Commerce. Beginning in 1840, 
Hale and Hallock editorialized in support of the establishment of"free trade" in 
mail delivery in the conviction that this would foster a salutary competition.2 
"Private enterprise carries the letters better, as well as cheaper, than the govern-
ment mails," Hale and Hallock declared, in a typical column in February 1844.3 
Hale and Hallock went so far as to proclaim the postal monopoly unconstitu-
tional, and to endorse the unsuccessful attempt of postal reformer Lysander 
Spooner to bring the issue before the Supreme Court. 4 
Woodbury was well aware of the challenges to the postal monopoly that its 
critics had raised, and met them head-on. His critique was at once historical and 
normative. To contend that the postal monopoly lacked a constitutional warrant 
was to ignore the circumstances that had existed seventy years earlier, when the 
federal Constitution had been originally drafted. At that time, Woodbury ob-
served, no one could have envisioned that the Post Office Department might 
one day face private competition. On the contrary, such a situation had become 
conceivable only in the relatively recent past, with the improvement of the road 
network, the coming of railroads and steamboats, and the rise of"greater private 
enterprise and capital."5 
Normative considerations underlay Woodbury's historical argument. The 
elimination of the postal monopoly, Woodbury warned, would benefit the few 
at the expense of the many. Should the courts dismantle the "great central 
regulations" that the federal government enforced, this would severely disad-
vantage the two-thirds of the American people who lived in the seven-eighths 
of the country that lay outside of the major commercial centers. No longer 
would these Americans be able to enjoy the postal cross-subsidies that the 
postal monopoly underwrote. While some contended that Congress might 
choose to fund these cross-subsidies out of the general treasury, Woodbury did 
not: like most public figures, he considered it axiomatic that the Post Office 
Department should, at the very least, break even. As a consequence, he consid-
ered the postal monopoly an indispensable mechanism for transferring the sur-
pluses generated in the major commercial centers to the thousands of towns 
and villages in the interior. In its absence, there would be no way to subsi-
dize the circulation of the myriad newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and 
government documents that crowded the mails. The subsidized delivery of such 
an enormous volume of printed matter was, Woodbury argued, one of the 
"great peculiarities" of the American government. Without it, Americans 
would be deprived of intelligence of every kind, including "food for the public 
mind, new views, new helps, new discoveries of inventions, new principles, 
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new reforms-in short, new improvements in everything that strengthen or 
adorn society."6 
Woodbury found the rationale for the federal regulation of communications 
so compelling that he extended it to embrace even the electric telegraph, a 
means of communication unknown to the framers of the federal Constitution. 
Woodbury was well aware that, for some time, a small but articulate group of 
promoters, newspaper editors, and congressmen had been advocating the com-
mercialization of the telegraph as a private enterprise. Here, once again, Wood-
bury demurred. Under no circumstances, Woodbury warned, should the gov-
ernment permit "private experiments" with the new technology to override the 
"welfare and wants of the whole community."7 
Woodbury's remarks provide a vantage point from which to explore the move-
ment that flourished between 1839 and 1851 to limit the involvement of th~ 
federal government in mail delivery and telegraphy-at the time, the two princi-
pal forms oflong-distance communication. This essay is neither a full history of 
this movement nor a survey of its relationship to the wider currents of American 
reform. Rather, it highlights certain features of its history in order to document 
the emergence in American public life of a new, and distinctive, understanding of 
the advantages and disadvantages of what we today would call communications 
deregulation, or what contemporaries called private enterprise. 
For over fifty years, historical accounts of nineteenth-century public life have 
downplayed the importance in national politics ofissues involving the regulatory 
powers of the federal government. Beginning in the 1940s, with Thomas C. 
Cochran's critique of the "presidential synthesis," and accelerating in the r 96os, 
with the rise of the "new" social history, it has been customary to dismiss fed-
eral regulation-along with most governmental institutions-as irrelevant to the 
larger drama of social and cultural change. 8 
Curiously enough, this neglect of federal public policy has extended even to 
political historians. Intent on exploring the social dimensions of public life at the 
grass roots, the so-called "new" political historians often ignored national politi-
cal issues altogether. Preoccupied with why voters voted, they only rarely pon-
dered what 'the government did. And when political historians did turn their 
attention to federal public policy, they typically reduced it to nothing more than 
a distributive struggle over discrete and often highly particularistic outcomes, 
such as a land sale or a political appointment. As a consequence, a host of 
regulatory and redistributive issues were assumed away.9 
This essay points historians of the early republic in a different direction. 
Building on recent scholarship on social relationships and cultural norms, it 
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shows how the study of national political issues can raise largh questions about 
American public life. In particular, it reveals that, even in the supposed heyday of 
laissez-faire, private enterprise remained a contested ideal. Not until the I 84os 
would public figures begin even to acknowledge the possibility that large-scale, 
nationwide enterprises, such as the postal system or the telegraph network, 
could be coordinated by institutions other than the federal government. The 
significance of this perceptual shift is often overlooked. To borrow a phrase from 
Eric Hobsbawm, private enterprise was an invented tradition, a late-Jacksonian 
era response to prior developments in American public life. 10 
The novelty of the idea that large-scale ventures could be coordinated by non-
governmental institutions is underscored by the infrequency with which the 
phrase "private enterprise" occurred in the writings of the founders of the 
American republic.11 The phrase was rarely used in early congressional debates, 
and appeared but once in the published edition of the journals of the Conti-
nental Congress. In the half-century between the adoption of the federal Con-
stitution and the Panic of 1837, the only president to invoke the phrase in a 
public address was Thomas Jefferson, who used it once in his I 806 message to 
Congress. 12 Jefferson's use of the phrase was revealing. In his address, Jefferson 
proposed that the federal government support the establishment of certain scien-
tific institutions that private groups lacked the resources to endow. "Education," 
Jefferson observed, "is here placed among the articles of public care, not that it 
would be proposed to take its ordinary branches out of the hands of private 
enterprise, which manages so much better all the concerns to which it is equal ." 13 
Though Jefferson acknowledged the superiority of private enterprise in "all 
the concerns to which it is equal," he implicitly conceded that public support 
would be imperative in certain realms, such as the funding of scientific institu-
tions. Nowhere did Jefferson imply-as would later government critics-that 
even complex and costly ventures were best coordinated by organizations other 
than the federal government. Indeed, it would be a mistake to assume that 
Jefferson accorded the phrase any special significance. If he had, he could have 
been expected to have repeated it in a variety of contexts. In fact, in a lengthy 
address he used it but once, as a felicitous counterpoint to "public care." 
The phrase private enterprise remained somewhat exotic until the l 8 3os.14 A 
few public figures, like Jefferson, invested it with positive meaning. The Post 
Office Department, observed New York Evening Post editor William Leggett in 
1835, did not own the means of conveyance upon which it relied to transmit the 
mail. Why, then, might not the legal restrictions on private mail delivery be 
abolished, and the business "safely trusted" to "private enterprise"?15 Others 
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considered it something of a put-down. The "grander cosmopolitan project" of 
a government-funded ship canal across the isthmus of Panama, one essayist 
warned in 1839, might well be stymied by small-scale ventures that were hostile 
to the "common interest of the world at large" and that could be consummated 
"even by private enterprise." 16 
Historians of the United States often assume that, in the United States, in 
contrast to Europe, big business preceded big government. 17 From the stand-
point of the Progressive era, this generalization is understandable. After all, by 
the early twentieth century, no public agency could match the administrative 
capacity of private corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railroad or American 
Telephone and Telegraph. 
In the early republic, a different situation prevailed. While most businesses re-
mained small, the government-including, above all, the federal government-
was enormous. Within the federal government, no public agency could match 
the size or geographical reach of the Post Office Department. No institution of 
any kind employed more people, deployed more complex managerial tech-
niques, or operated on a comparable scale. Few commanded a comparable mea-
sure of trust. 18 
The large size and expansive mandate of American governmental institu-
. tions-at the state as well as the federal level-owed much to their genuine popu-
larity. Ordinary Americans coveted a vast panoply of public works-including 
canals, roads, and improved mail delivery-and legislators responded. 19 
Prior to l 8 5 l, Congress mandated that improvements in mail delivery be 
funded out of postal revenue, without recourse to the general treasury. While 
this requirement was occasionally relaxed, it was rarely ignored. To fund popu-
lar, though expensive servic7s-such as the low-cost circulation of newspapers 
and the extension of postal facilities into thinly settled regions-legislators estab-
lished an ingenious regulatory regime. To keep the Post Office Department self-
sustaining, postal administrators used the surplus generated on letter postage to 
cover the cost of transmitting newspapers and other kinds of printed matter, and 
the surplus generated in the major commercial centers to maintain postal facili-
ties in the rest of the country. In no sense were these cross-subsidies merely 
distributive, in the sense of providing easily divisible benefits to particular claim-
ants. Rather, they had structural biases that reflected-and, indeed, helped to 
promote-policy goals that were widely shared. 20 
Prior to steam-powered transportation, this regulatory regime worked rea-
sonably well. In large measure, this was because postal administrators retained a 
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great measure of control over the stagecoach proprietors and post riders upon 
whom they relied to transport the mail. Postal administrators set the schedules 
that stagecoach proprietors followed, and had little trouble discouraging post 
riders-who they themselves had appointed-from circulating mailable matter 
on their own private account. 
With the advent of steam-powered transportation-steamboats, railroads, and 
ocean-faring steamships-the situation grew more complex. By greatly increas-
ing the facilities for travel, these new means of conveyance enormously ex-
panded the opportunities for travelers to carry small packages-including let-
ters-on their persons, or, as the phrase went, "outside of the mail." No longer 
was the mail carriers' carrying capacity confined to the stage drivers' baggage 
rack and the post riders" saddlebags. And no longer did postal administrators set 
the schedules for the means of conveyance on which the mail carriers relied. 
This novel situation created a market niche that was quickly exploited by the 
enterprising group of young men who founded the parcel delivery industry. The 
first successful parcel delivery company was established in l 8 3 9 by William 
Harnden, a twenty-five-year-old former railroad conductor. Harnden set him-
self up in business by advertising that, for a set fee, he would carry newspapers 
and small parcels by railroad and steamboat between Boston and New York. For 
a time, Harnden also carried letters under a special arrangement with the Post 
Office Department. Harnden's success was assured when, following a tip from 
the New York newspaper vendor James W. Hale, he coordinated his trips to 
meet the heightened demand for high-speed communication that followed the 
establishment by Samuel Cunard of ocean-faring steamship service between 
Liverpool and Boston. 21 
Harnden's innovation led to the establishment of similar parcel delivery com-
panies throughout much of New England and the mid-Atlantic states. Like 
Harnden, these companies often carried letters, which as a consequence of the 
existing regulatory regime they could transmit for substantially lower rates than 
the federal government. To avoid running afoul of the laws prohibiting compe-
tition in the letter-mail business, Harnden took various precautions. "Keep 
good friends with the Post Office folks," Harnden wrote a business associate in 
1841, after his original contract with the Post Office Department had expired: 
"Gain and keep their confidence. Receive nothing mailable .... You will have 
no small number of Post Office spies at your heels. They will watch you very 
closely. See that they have their trouble for their pains."22 Harnden's competitors 
ignored his warnings and quickly became major competitors of the Post Office 
Department in the lucrative letter-mail business throughout much of the Adan-
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tic seaboard and upstate New York. By 1845, private expresses and ordinary 
travelers were together diverting from the Post Office Department as much as 
two-thirds of all the correspondence in the country. 23 
The rise of the parcel delivery industry raised basic questions about postal 
policy. If the private expresses could make large profits by underbidding the Post 
Office Department, why did the basic letter rate remain so high? Between 1840 
and 1845, this question received a great deal of coverage in the press. During this 
period, individuals from throughout the country flooded Congress with peti-
tions for" cheap postage" -including, as its centerpiece, a major reduction in the 
basic letter rate. Few of the major political issues of the day boasted a broader 
base of support. Perhaps the best measure of the popularity of cheap postage 
was the willingness of so many Americans to patronize the private expresses-
mounting what was, in effect, a massive boycott of the federal government. 
Many congressmen opposed the letter-rate reduction that the petitioners 
sought. They feared, not implausibly, that such a radical change would signifi-
cantly reduce the revenue that postal administrators relied upon to maintain the 
existing regulatory regime. Echoing their misgivings were Postmaster General 
Charles Wickliffe and the Washington Madisonian, the official organ of the Tyler 
administration.24 Taking to the offensive, Wickliffe intensified the legal cam-
paign that postal administrators had long waged against their competitors. By 
1845, Wickliffe's subordinates had instituted hundreds oflawsuits against indi-
vidual companies. This prosecutorial crusade was so elaborate':' that, at its height, 
James W. Hale, now the proprietor ofhis own letter-mail company, quipped that 
he was the "most arrested" man in the world.25 
This combination of popular defiance and governmental intransigence occa-
sioned a searching reevaluation of the possibilities of private enterprise. Initially, 
as maverick expressman Lysander Spooner would later reminisce, his critics 
derided the mail delivery co~pany that he had established as "destitute of all 
patriotic or moral principles." Gradually, however, they came to dignify it as 
"private enterprise."26 No longer did contemporaries assume-as had, for exam-
ple, Thomas Jefferson-that private enterprise must necessarily be restricted to 
commercial ventures that were relatively small in scale. With the rise of the 
private expresses, it was now plausible to envision-for the first time in Ameri-
can history-that even the mail delivery business might be entrusted to private 
companies. At the height of the private mail delivery boom, one of Harnden's 
former agents, Henry Wells, was reputed to have offered to take over the entire 
mail delivery business and run it himself. 27 Prior to the boom, such a proposal 
would have been quite literally inconceivable. In a similar spirit, political econo-
mist Amasa Walker offered Congress $1 million in 1844 for the rights to the 
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postal monopoly for twenty years on the condition that he maintain the existing 
level of service while significantly reducing the basic letter rate. 28 
Several public figures followed the lead of the Journal ef Commerce and called 
for the outright repeal of legislative prohibitions on private competition. Yet 
such appeals were relatively rare. More characteristic was the response of a special 
committee of the New York Chamber of Commerce. In August 1844, this 
committee presented the postmaster general an open letter on postal reform. 
Unsurprisingly, the committee endorsed a major reduction in the basic letter 
rate. Yet the committee also supported new legislation to tighten the laws pro-
hibiting private mail delivery, on the grounds that the present conveyance of 
letters by private expresses-"even if legal" - was not a proper source to be 
permanently relied on for "so responsible a trust."29 
Public sentiment, so far as it can be gauged from petitions to Congress, 
expressed similar misgivings. In the early 184os, thousands of Americans peti-
tioned Congress to lower the basic letter rate. Yet few regarded the private 
expresses as anything more than a temporary expedient, even though many 
recognized that, by successfully underbidding the Post Office Department, these 
companies had provided a major impetus to the rate reductions that the peti-
tioners desired. Should the Post Office Department match its competitors, pre-
dicted the Illinois General Assembly in I 843, the whole people might soon 
secure a level of service that, at present, was confined to a few: "Under a just and 
reasonable rate of postage, this successful competition with the public mail could 
never succeed."30 
Newspaper editors voiced related concerns. Arunah S. Abell of the Baltimore 
Sun prided himself on being the first editor south of the Hudson to champion the 
cause of postal reform. 31 Yet Abell had little patience with what he derisively 
termed the "daily increasing activity and efficiency" of the private expresses, and 
urged Congress to reduce the basic letter rate so that these "evils" might be 
averted. 32 The mail delivery business, reflected Horace Greeley in the New-York 
Daily Tribune, had for many years exceeded the "powers"' of private enterprise. 
Now the situation had changed and the federal government should respond by 
lowering the basic letter rate. Greeley deplored the prosecution of the private 
expresses: "No government is in the discharge of its rightful duty while thus 
seeking to repress private enterprise and industry."33 Yet Greeley regarded private 
competition as a mere temporary expedient that would hasten the long-hoped-
for postal reform: "We believe one mail establishment can serve the people of the 
whole Union better and cheaper than a thousand warring concerns."34 
Greeley's straddle was typical of many city editors . Private enterprise, declared 
an editorialist in the Buffalo Commercial, would hasten postal reform. And when 
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it did, the authority to transmit letters and other mailable matter should be 
"exclusively vested in the government."35 What would happen, wondered the 
editors of the Washington Daily National Intelligencer, if the Supreme Court 
declared the postal monopoly unconstitutional? Without that "great regulator," 
the Post Office Department, how would the public be guarded from the exorbi-
tant charges that a private combination might levy? And who would guarantee 
the sanctity of the mails?36 
Even Hale and Hallock of the Journal of Commerce recognized that certain 
private expresses might endanger the public good. The occasion for this remark-
able departure from free trade orthodoxy was the establishment by a consor-
tium of merchants in January 1845 of a private horse express between Coving-
ton, Georgia, and Montgomery, Alabama. Such an express, Hale and Hallock 
warned, might well give a half-dozen men in New Orleans advance knowledge 
of a sudden rise in the markets in Liverpool-a valuable asset, should the New 
Orleans market be glutted with cotton, wheat, and other sought-after goods. 
Hale and Hallock found the merchants' "private enterprise" commendable, yet 
considered it a "nuisance" to the mercantile interests and urged that it be swiftly 
"countervailed" with the establishment by the Post Office Department of a 
competing government express.37 
Private mail delivery fared little better in Congress. Between July 1842 and 
March 1845, postal reform was the subject of several long and sometimes con-
tentious debates . Though several congressmen questioned the propriety of pros-
ecuting the private expresses, none hailed them as commendable examples of 
private enterprise or urged the abolition of the postal monopoly-as, for exam-
ple, one congressman had in 1839.38 On the contrary, everyone affirmed the 
indispensability of the existing regufatory regime. The crux of the matter, ex-
plained Congressman James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, was to protect postal 
revenue from outside assault. What would happen, Buchanan asked, if the pri-
vate expresses rendered profitless the very routes postal administrators relied on 
to keep the institution from running into debt? To pose the question was to 
answer it. Under no circumstances, Buchanan declared, should Congress permit 
its "unquestionable constitutional power" to be defeated by the "lawless action 
of individuals."39 Some congressmen favored stiff new penalties to frustrate pri-
vate enterprise in mail delivery; others advocated a major reduction in the basic 
letter rate. Still others favored some combination of the two. On one point, 
everyone agreed. The private expresses must be stopped. 40 
Few congressman attacked private enterprise in mail delivery with more 
ingenuity than Maryland senator William Merrick. It was "indispensably neces-
sary," Merrick declared, to prevent by suitable legislation the "great and alarming 
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frauds" that the private expresses had perpetrated. 41 After all, the proprietors of 
these companies were nothing but mere "private competing individuals" actu-
ated by the "cupidity of gain": the public good was far above such "mere" 
pecuniary considerations. Merrick conceded that an exclusive reliance on re-
strictive legislation could never solve the problem that the private expresses 
posed. In addition, he believed, Congress should curry public favor by lowering 
the basic letter rate. Mollified by the rate reductions, the public would once 
again sustain the government's legal campaign against the private expresses and 
perpetuate the regulatory regime.42 
Merrick's compromise became a cornerstone of the Post Office Act of 1845, 
which simultaneously reduced postal rates while strengthening legal prohibi-
tions on private mail delivery. The popular response to this legislation, however, 
fell short of Merrick's hopes. Though Congress had substantially reduced the 
basic letter rate, the new rate remained higher than that charged by many of the 
private expresses. Predictably, a few decided to risk prosecution and remain in 
business. "Private expresses," reported one New Hampshire newspaper editor 
shortly after the new law went into effect, "have not been discontinued in this 
quarter. Far from it. They are now doing as large a business as ever, carrying 
letters at halfthe government rates .... Th.e new postage act did not abate what is 
called 'private enterprise,' and the act itself, it is thought, will soon be found to 
be insufficient."43 
Within Congress, the failure to suppress the private expresses led a growing 
number of legislators to call for the outright privatization of the Post Office 
Department. In the near future, speculated the chairman of the House post 
office committee in June 1848, the public good might well be better served if 
Congress replaced the postal monopoly with a competitive "system" that en-
couraged "individual enterprise." Under such an arrangement, Congress could 
retain the power to designate post routes and set maximum postal rates. The 
conveyance of the mail, however, would become the prerogative not of salaried 
dependents but of the same kind of energetic individuals who were running the 
private expresses and the nascent telegraph industry.44 It would not be long, 
declared one senator a few months later, before the "present post office system" 
would cease to exist, with its "duties" taken over by private enterprise.45 It was 
only a matter of time before legislators took the logic of privatization to its 
extreme and proposed-as did Gerrit Smith of New York in 1854-the outright 
abolition of the Post Office Department.46 
In the end, however, all proposals to deregulate the Post Office Department 
failed. In an era that witnessed the defeat of John Quincy Adams's national 
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program of internal improvement and the triumph of Andrew Jackson 's war on 
the Bank of the United States, this failure is worth underscoring. How can it be 
explained? 
The failure of postal deregulation owed something to the role that postal 
patronage had come by the 1840s to play in campaign finance. For the party 
workers who rallied voters to the polls, postal contracts and jobs were a highly 
coveted reward. For postal reformers Joshua Leavitt and Barnabas Bates, this 
simple fact doomed any thoroughgoing reform. The "naked truth," Leavitt 
editorialized in 1845, was that Congress perpetuated the postal monopoly nei-
ther for the benefit of the people, nor by virtue of any constitutional authority, 
but to provide party leaders with jobs for their supporters.47 Political exigency, 
Bates confided to one-time expressman Lysander Spooner in l 8 5 l, derailed 
Bates's attempt to secure from the federal government an exclusive franchise 
to transmit the mail. Bates had failed-or so Bates assumed-because Con-
gress insisted on maintaining the Post Office Department for "electioneering 
purposes."48 
Partisan imperatives furnished postal reformers like Leavitt and Bates with a 
convenient explanation for their inability to secure the reforms that they sought. 
Yet they cannot explain the failure of postal deregulation. Far more important 
was the reluctance of Congress to buck public opinion and dismantle the exist-
ing regulatory regime. Though thousands of Americans had patronized the 
private expresses in the early l 84os, only a few joined Hale and Hallock of the 
Journal of Commerce in championing private enterprise as a permanent alternative 
to the Post Office Department. Of the hundr~ds of petitions on postal topics that 
found their way to Congress during the I 84os, for example, few praised the 
private expresses, while none called for the outright abolition of the Post Office 
Department. What petitioners sought, instead, was the elimination of special 
privileges for government officials, improvements in the level of service, and, 
most important of all, a major reduction in the basic letter rate. Popular pressure 
proved so compelling that, in l 8 5 l, Congress lifted a major constraint upon 
postal expansion. Henceforth postal revenue no longer had to cover postal 
expenses, making it possible for Congress to cut postal rates-as it did in l 8 5 l -
without a countervailing reduction in the level of service. 49 
Postal improvements, in short, were popular, while private mail delivery was 
not. Should Congress permit private competition, explained Missouri congress-
man Willard P Hall in l 8 5 l, it would be well advised to get out of the mail 
delivery business altogether. Yet such a radical proposal, Hall added, had the 
support neither of Congress nor of the "people of the country."50 The existing 
regulatory regime, lawyer Charles M . Ellis declared at about the same time in an 
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unusually forthright statement of a common view, was not a monopoly in its 
"odious sense." In a "democratic state of society," Ellis posited, a monopoly 
deprived the people of the ability to control the means of communication 
through "united and efficient action." In no sense was this true of the Post Office 
Department. For reasons vital to the public welfare, the federal government had 
an obligation to put everyone on an equal footing in the "transmission of intel-
ligence" by making it "as free, as quick, as sure and as cheap as the light of day." 
Should a private mail delivery company ever rival the federal government in its 
"completeness," it would· be the "most dangerous power in the State."51 
A comparable faith in the regulatory power of the federal government shaped 
the initial public response to telegraphy. Electric telegraphy was new in the 
l 84os, and it was by no means obvious to contemporaries how it was going to be 
commercialized, or even whether it would promote the public good. These 
anxieties are worth underscoring, since they are often forgotten. From the 
outset, newspaper editors, merchants, and public figures from almost every 
corner of the United States hailed the new technology as the greatest invention 
of the age. Almost no one questioned the desirability of facilitating high-speed-
and, at least in theory, instantaneous-communication between far-flung lo-
calities. 52 Accompanying this euphoria, however, was a strong undercurrent of 
concern. The new technology was so powerful, its critics warned, that were it 
not properly regulated, it might well prove less of a blessing than a curse. 
The appeal of federal control helps explain why the first telegraph line in the 
United States to be open to the public-a forty-mile line between Washington 
and Baltimore-was financed out of general revenue and administered during its 
first two years by the Post Office Department. Among the most tireless cham-
pions of federal control was Samuel F. B. Morse, the painter-turned-inventor 
whose ownership of a majority share in a key telegraph patent gave him a major 
voice in the early history of the industry. Morse fervently believed that the 
federal government should own the rights to his patent-which, with a self-
confidence bordering on arrogance, he presumed to cover every important 
feature of the new technology. In pursuit of this goal, Morse secured federal 
support for experiments that culminated in 1844 with the successful demonstra-
tion of the commercial possibilities of electric telegraphy and in 1845 with the 
opening of the Washington-Baltimore line. 
Morse's faith in federal control antedated by almost a decade the commercial-
ization of the new technology. "It would seem most natural," Morse observed in 
1837, to "connect a telegraphic system with the Post Office Department; for, 
although it does not carry a mail, yet it is another mode of accomplishing the 
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principal object for which the mail is established, to wit: the rapid and regular 
transmissioq of intelligence."53 Morse predicated his postal analogy on the ex-
pansive role that the Post Office Department had come to assume since the 
I 820s in the circulation of time-specific information. Beginning with Postmas-
ter General John McLean, a succession of postal administrators had proclaimed 
that the federal government had an obligation to transmit information faster 
than any possible rival. In an age when merchants could make fortunes overnight 
by runniqg private horse expresses to outpace the mails, this federal guarantee 
was vital to the thousands of planters and farmers who were dependent on 
foreign markets for the sale of their crops. Federal control, Morse predicted, 
would prevent the few from defrauding the many. Should Congress leave tele-
graphy to speculators to monopolize for themselves, Morse warned, it might 
easily become the means of enriching a single corporation while causing the 
"bankruptcy of thousands."54 
Equally disturbing for Morse was the possibility that the federal government 
might monopolize the new technology by itself. Such an arrangement, Morse 
warned, might well work "vast mischief." The optimal form of federal control, 
instead, was a mixed enterprise in which the federal government retained the 
exclusive right to the new technology by virtue of its ownership of the key 
patents-including, of course, Morse's own. Under such a scheme, the federal 
government could designate a number oflines for its own use. The core of the 
network, however-the "private telegraphs," as Morse termed them-would be 
built and maintained by investors upon payment to the federal government of a 
licensing fee that granted them exclusive rights to specific routes. In this way, the 
federal government would possess the communication facilities it needed, while 
encouraging a general competition among investors governed by whatever reg-
ulations legislators might think proper. Such "checks and preventives of abuse," 
Morse predicted, would harness this "otherwise dangerous power" to the public 
good. Given the enterprising character of Americans, Morse predicted, it was 
"not visionary" to suppose that before long the whole surface of the country 
would be "channeled" for those "nerves which are to diffuse, with the speed of 
thought, a knowledge of all that is occurring throughout the land; making, in 
fact, one neighborhood of the whole country."55 Prior to l 84 7, every contract that 
Morse entered into specified that Congress retained the right to purchase his 
patent for a mutually agreed upon sum. After 1847, Morse and his business 
associates struggled doggedly-though, ultimately, with limited success-to ex-
ploit the new technology in an orderly fashion by using their ownership of 
Morse's patent to enforce common procedures for companies wishing to enter 
the market. 
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Similar, though usually less elaborate, plans for federal control had broad 
support in the press. Early on, many editors regarded a federal buyout of Morse's 
patent as inevitable, if only because, like the private expresses, private telegraph 
companies threatened to deprive the Post Office Department of a great deal of 
revenue. Others looked to federal control as a safeguard against speculative fraud 
and abuse. Private enterprise, declared James Gordon Bennett of the New York 
Herald in April l 845, was fast erecting telegraph lines in many directions, yet the 
public interest would be much more securely promoted should the federal gov-
ernment undertake the arrangement.56 It must be "clear to every one," declared 
James Watson Webb of the Morning Courier and New-York Enquirer, at about the 
same time, that no private enterprise should be permitted to use the new tech-
nology for "private and exclusive purposes." On the contrary, the federal gov-
ernment should control it and make "such a disposition of its vast powers as 
should most conduce to the public welfare."57 So enormous were the dangers of 
speculation, editorialized William M . Swain of the Philadelphia Public Ledger the 
following October, that the federal government might even find it advisable to 
prohibit anyone other than a government official from transmitting a message 
over the wires. "Perhaps the best security," Swain speculated, "would be in the 
prohibition of all private correspondence. Some will say that this would render 
the telegraph nearly useless. We grant that it would-to speculators, and we add 
that for mercantile speculations only will it be much used in private correspon-
dence, excepting during elections."58 
Some contemporaries openly doubted whether telegraphy could be admin-
istered as a public-private joint venture, as Morse had hoped. Congress had erred 
in permitting the new technology to be commercialized by a "private company," 
warned a New York newspaper correspondent in 1845 who styled himself 
"Mercator," since no governmental body could devise regulations sufficiently 
stringent to "shut out the chance, not to say probability, ofits abuse." Should the 
"vast monopoly" fall into the hands of speculators, Mercator warned, an indig-
nant public could be expected to rise up and destroy its property immediately 
after it learned of the first major speculation to have made use of its "agency."59 
The merits of federal control were recognized even by stalwart champions of 
private enterprise. Should telegraphic promoters refuse the "privilege" of send-
ing and receiving telegraphic dispatches to anyone willing to pay a reasonable 
fee, Hale and Hallock reflected in the journal ef Commerce in January 1845, 
private control of an "instrumentality so powerful" would be a "public nui-
sance" that should not be tolerated.60 And were speculators to gain control of the 
new medium, Hale and Hallock warned in November of the following year, this 
would be an "evil of no ordinary magnitude" that would require the prompt 
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intervention of the strong arm of the law. The reluctance with which even such 
fervent champions of private enterprise endorsed the privatization of telegraphy 
was perhaps the most telling evidence of the extent to which its future remained 
contested. Nineteen months after the telegraph had made its commercial debut, 
the editors of one of the most influential commercial newspapers in the country 
remained uncertain as to whether the new technology would be a "public 
blessing" or a "public nuisance."61 
Editorial support for federal control owed a good deal to the uneasiness with 
which editors contemplated the disruptive effects of telegraphy on their own 
news-gathering efforts. Some editors worried that private telegraph companies 
might discriminate against their newspaper in ways that would benefit their 
rivals . Others worried that the new technology would raise the cost of news 
gathering. Telegraphic dispatches were expensive, and, at least initially, it was far 
from self-evident that newspapers would receive favorable rates. At present, 
observed the editor of the Baltimore Patriot, newspaper editors enjoyed under 
federal law the right to exchange with each other an unlimited number of 
newspapers free of charge. These exchanges, in turn, provided editors with the 
bulk of the news that they relied on to fill their columns. Should the Post Office 
Department retain control of the new technology, this policy would presumably 
be maintained; if it devolved upon private enterprise, however, it might well be 
abandoned. In either event, the postmaster general should work with the private 
telegraph companies to ensure the free circulation of all information "important 
or interesting to the whole people." The cost of this information, in turn, should 
be borne by those individuals who used the telegraph for "private benefit or 
speculation" -by analogy with the longstanding presumption that the postage 
on merchants' letters subsidized the exchanges upon which editors relied for 
their news: "This will be found, we are sure, to be the true policy of the 
telegraphs, whether regard be had to their profits or to their use." Should this 
policy be adopted, editors would continue to receive news broadcasts free of 
charge "as in the case of the exchange papers in the ordinary mail."62 
This constellation of concerns helps explain why federal control of telegraphy 
had the backing of four of the most widely circulated newspapers in the coun-
try-the New York Sun, the New York Herald, the Baltimore Sun, and the 
Philadelphia Public Ledger. 63 The editors of the "penny press," as these news-
papers would come to be known, had been quick to fault the Post Office 
Department for high rates and poor service. Indeed, they were among the 
leading champions of postal reform. These criticisms notwithstanding, they 
remained skeptical of all proposals to privatize the new technology. It was not 
hard to see why. In contrast to their more expensive, better-established rivals-
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such as the Morning Courier and the journal ef Commerce-the penny papers were 
dependent for revenue on daily sales rather than annual subscriptions. As a 
consequence, their editors were extremely sensiti\;'"e to anything that might affect 
their access to a steady stream of cheap and abundant up-to-date news. 
Editorial support for federal control persisted even after private companies 
had begun to extend lines to the major commercial centers. "Public opinion," 
declared the editor of the Philadelphia-based Pennsylvania Inquirer in June l 846, 
was "decidedly in favor" of a federal takeover of the various telegraph.lines that 
private individuals had established. A federally owned and operated telegraph, 
the editor predicted, would reduce rates and improve service. The many individ-
uals who had built up the telegraph industry during the past year deserved great 
credit for their "enterprise and perseverance," yet such a "vast engine of com-
munication" should be in the hands of the federal government under proper 
regulations. 64 
Even critics of federal control acknowledged its popularity. Though he him-
self favored the commercialization of the telegraph as a private enterprise, Jere-
miah Hughes of Niles's National Register acknowledged that his views were 
unique, at least within the press. "All the other public journals that expressed 
opinions," Hughes observed in September 1846, "appeared to urge the govern-
ment to make the telegraph a government monopoly." Impatience with private 
enterprise, Hughes inferred, was a logical counterpart of the universal desire to 
expand the telegraph network rapidly, since it was taken for granted that the 
federal government could construct new lines faster than even the most enter-
prising of private companies. 65 
Perhaps the most careful student of popular sentiment on the telegraph issue 
was Morse 's business agent, Amos Kendall. Federal control-or so Kendall re-
ported to Morse's business partner, Francis 0. J . Smith, in a series of confidential 
letters in l 845-was broadly popular, making it imperative that the patentees not 
foreclose the possibility of a government sale. It was "all important," Kendall 
lectured Smith shortly after the opening of the Washington-Baltimore line, to 
keep "public opinion with us."66 Most telegraph investors, Kendall explained in 
l 846 to the chairman of the House post office committee, opposed such a sale of 
Morse's patent to the government. Nonetheless, Kendall added, the owners of 
Morse's patent felt themselves "called upon" by public opinion to "hold this 
great instrument of wealth and power" at the disposition of the federal govern-
ment for a "reasonable consideration."67 
Federal control even received the formal endorsement of one group of promi-
nent merchants. It was simply unacceptable-declared the influential Baltimore 
mercantile house of Alexander Brown & Co. in November 1846, in heading up 
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a petition to Congress signed by many of the city's leading merchants-for the 
federal government to permit the private expresses to beat out the Post Office 
Department day after day. Should Congress purchase Morse's patent, this evil 
could be avoided. "The control of the entire commercial and news correspon-
dence of the country," the merchants explained, was a "tremendous power" that 
ought to be possessed exclusively by the "most responsible public agents." The 
"obvious fact" that the new technology gave telegraph managers control over 
the interests of merchants, the press, the government, and indirectly of the 
whole people was sufficient to "show the danger" ofleaving it in private hands. 68 
Federal control also had the support of Whig presidential candidate Henry 
Clay. Should the new technology remain in private hands, Clay warned in a 
letter to one of Morse's business partners during the height of the 1844 cam-
paign, speculators would be able to "monopolize intelligence": "I think such an 
engine ought to be exclusively under the control of government."69 
One of the most elaborate appeals for federal control took the form of a report 
to Congress in March r 845 by Georgia Whig Absalom Chappell. Enamored, 
like Morse, with the postal-telegraphic analogy, Chappell tried unsuccessfully to 
persuade legislators to extend Morse's telegraph from Baltimore to New York. 
Chappell conceded the dangers of most projects to augment federal power, yet 
regarded the telegraph as an exception. "The great and fundamental principle" 
upon which the Post Office Department operated, Chappell postulated, was the 
presumption that the federal government not be "outstripped" in the circulation 
of "correspondence and intelligence." In support of this principle, Chappell 
observed, Congress had recently awarded lucrative mail contracts to several 
railroad corporations. It was with "equal certainty,'' Chappell predicted, that 
Congress would adopt for postal purposes any other "newly discovered agency 
or contrivance" that offered a "decided advantage of celerity."70 
Chappell's logic failed to sway prominent Democrats in Congress, and had 
little effect on the Democratic president, James K. Polk, who does not seem to 
have left any record ofhis views on the subject. The Polk administration's official 
organ, the Washington Union, took no position on the telegraph issue, though it 
did run a letter from a supporter of federal control as late as December 1846.7 1 
Given the traditional Democratic hostility toward governmental activism, this 
was perhaps not surprising. More intriguing was the fact that federal control did 
win the approval of several Democratic-leaning newspapers, including the New 
York Evening Post, the Philadelphia Pennsylvanian, and the Washington Con-
stitution. Federal control also had the support, at various times, of a number 
of nationally prominent Democrats. These included Polk's postmaster gen-
eral, Cave Johnson; two former Democratic cabinet members, Levi Woodbury 
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and Amos Kendall; Morse himself; and former Democratic congressman Fran-
cis 0. J. Smith. To be sure, none but Woodbury were disinterested: Johnson 
stood to gain in power and prestige should the telegraph remain under his 
control; Smith owned a percentage of Morse 's patent; and Kendall was Morse's 
business agent. 
Smith made the case for federal control in an essay on postal reform that he 
published in the February 1845 issue of the Merchants' Magaz ine. Federal funding 
for the rapid extension of telegraphy, Smith contended, was far preferable to the 
"odious system" of harassing the private expresses in the courts. Smith doubted 
that the Post Office Department could ever underbid the private expresses, 
given the constraints that the regulatory regime imposed. Were the federal 
government to establish its own telegraph network, however, the challenge 
posed by the private expresses would disappear. "Can any one believe," Smith 
asked rhetorically, that if Congress lowered the basic letter rate and the Post 
Office Department established a low-cost telegraph on the Washington-New 
York route, the private letter-mail companies would persist, even if no penal law 
should be interposed to deter them? Should the Post Office Department string 
wires throughout the country, Smith predicted, it would attain the "highest 
approach to omniscience, within the limits of the Union, that human wants or 
human agency need aspire to."72 
Kendall's position on federal control was complex. As a good Democrat, 
Kendall retained strong misgivings about governmental activism. The true ob-
ject of government, Kendall postulated in r 843 , was not to promote the happi-
ness of the people, but to enable the people to promote their own happiness.73 
Instead of enacting new penal laws to stymie the private expresses, why not 
encourage the federal government to retrench its own establishments as fast as · 
private enterprise advanced, and" content itself" with doing only that which the 
citizen "cannot effect for himself?"74 Indeed, at one point, Kendall went so far as 
to propose that the Post Office Department abandon the railroad altogether as a 
means of conveyance, and rely exclusively on post riders to carry the mail .75 
Yet Kendall also recognized that certain public projects fell within the legiti-
mate domain of the federal government. As postmaster general in the I 8 3 os, 
Kendall had endorsed various innovations in high-speed communication, in-
cluding an elaborate Washington-New Orleans horse express. By far the most 
ambitious innovation to win Kendall's assent was an optical telegraph-modeled 
loosely on the French prototype of Claude Chappe-that Kendall hoped might 
one day connect the country's leading ports.76 "That great public benefits will 
arise from the establishment of a line of [optical] telegraphs along our coasts, if 
not into the interior, there can be no doubt," Kendall declared in a public letter 
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in February l 8 3 7. "The rapid diffusion of intelligence is of great importance in 
our busy country, and a portion of our abundant public funds cannot, in my 
opinion, be more usefully employed than in the attainment of that object."77 
The awkwardness ofKendall's position was evident in a letter that he wrote in 
August l 845 to Morse's partner, Francis 0. J. Smith. "One consideration" that 
favored a buyout, Kendall explained to Smith, was the "'certainty' " of a quick 
and substantial financial return. " If you and I and my principals can realize at 
once all of[ the] wealth that the human heart ought to desire, it is better for us to 
take it, than to fight our way for years through difficulties and perplexities, 
however brilliant in imagination may be the prospective."78 
By far the most determined Democratic champion of federal control was 
Polk's postmaster general, Cave Johnson, the administrator under whose direc-
tion the first commercial telegraph had been established in 1845. Johnson's 
support for federal control is often misunderstood. Well known as a fiscal con-
servative, Johnson conceded in his annual report for 1845 that, based on the 
revenue generated thus far by the Washington-Baltimore line, he did not believe 
the federal government could ever run the telegraph at a profit. 79 Johnson's 
gloomy fiscal assessment outraged Amos Kendall, who accused him of deliber-
ately using his public office to depress the value of Morse's patent. 80 In the years 
after the Civil War, Johnson's prediction would be routinely cited as proof that 
federal administrators had stumbled badly in their first attempt to run the indus-
try, and should not be given a second chance. 
However wrongheaded Johnson's prediction may appear in hindsight, it is 
important to remember that it was the only caveat that he raised in what was, in 
fact, a broad-gauged appeal for federal control. "In the hands of individuals or 
associations,'' Johnson declared in the same report, the telegraph might become 
the "most potent instrument" the world ever knew to effect "sudden and large 
speculations-to rob the many of their just advantages, and concentrate them 
upon the few." To forestall such a catastrophe, Johnson regarded some kind of 
regulatory apparatus as imperative: "The use of an instrument so powerful for 
good or evil cannot with safety to the people be left in the hands of private 
individuals uncontrolled by law."81 
Military exigency reinforced Johnson's commitment to federal control. 
Shortly after the start of the Mexican War, Johnson reported to Congress that a 
private consortium of New York editors headed up by Moses Y. Beach of the 
New York Sun had established a horse express in Alabama to transmit from 
Mexico newspaper clippings with military reports in advance of the mail. The 
proprietors of this express, Johnson conceded, violated no federal law, since the 
recently enacted post office law had specifically exempted newspapers from the 
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postal monopoly. Still, Johnson hoped to supplant the horse express with a 
telegraph for the duration of the war, and took the trouble to secure from 
h " lib al "82 Kendall the patent rights for such a venture on t e most er terms. 
Johnson failed to secure congressional support for his wartime telegraph and, in 
1847, the Washington-Baltimore line passed out of federal control. With the 
exception of a brief moment during the First World War, postal administrators 
would never again be able to plausibly contend that they could outpace private 
enterprise in the circulation of time-specific information on commerce and 
public affairs. 
Popular support for federal control never disappeared altogether. With the 
expansion of the telegraph network, however, several once-potent criticisms of 
the new technology came to seem overblown. Once the new technology be-
came a mundane reality, rather than a visionary dream, editors discovered it to be 
less threatening to ordinary commercial transactions than they had feared, and 
more useful in their daily operations than they had anticipated. 83 It was, for 
example, by no means incidental that the most searching critiques in the New 
York press of private enterprise in telegraphy antedated the extension of the first 
telegraph line to New York City. 
Particularly important in legitimating private control of the new technology 
were the steady stream of public statements that Amos Kendall issued between 
l 845 and l 84 7. In these statements, Kendall enunciated the rules and regula-
tions of Morse's Magnetic Telegraph Company and defended the patentees' 
right to a monopoly of Morse's patent. "Of one kind of monopoly I am in 
favor," Kendall declared in the Washington Union in September 1847, "a mo-
nopoly of a man's own property .. . . Patent rights are as much private property as 
printing presses ."84 To mollify the press, Kendall promised editors special rates 
for the circulation of news-a promise that Kendall's own long tenure as a 
newspaper editor rendered especially credible. 85 And to win over merchants, 
Kendall stressed that his company would guarantee equal access for anyone who 
could afford the regular fees, and dismiss any employee who manipulated its 
wires to promote a purely private speculation. To fault the new technology for 
encouraging insider trading, Kendall believed, was particularly unfair. Prior to 
the advent of the electric telegraph, Kendall reminded his critics, merchants had 
long maintained an optical telegraph between New York and Philadelphia for 
the benefit of"speculators exclusively"-and no one had complained. It would be 
impossible, Kendall added, to devise a set of administrative procedures that 
would preclude the possibility of speculative abuse. Still, the rules his company 
had devised would "place all men on equality, in the use of the telegraph"-even 
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though, of course, they could not "make them equal in the sagacity, industry, 
and enterprise, which enables them to use it profitably to themselves."B6 
Beginning in the summer of 1 846, criticisms of federal control began to find 
their way into the press. Led by Niles's National Register and the Albany Evening 
Journal, a small but influential number of journals raised questions about the 
effectiveness of public administration of the new technology and warned against 
the political dangers that might accompany federal control. B7 Private enterprise, 
they agreed, had thus far worked remarkably well. Just as competition had 
brought about major reforms in mail delivery, editorialized Jeremiah Hughes of 
Niles, so, too, it would spur technical innovation in telegraphy. BB The commer-
cialization of the new technology by the federal government was likely to prove 
very costly, warned the Evening]ournal, and was in any event too complicated for 
public administrators to coordinate. Furthermore, unless Congress enacted laws 
as arbitrary as the laws prohibiting private competition in mail delivery, Morse's 
patent would in all likelihood be quickly superseded, and "individual enter-
prise" would drive the government into bankruptcy.B9 If any business could be 
safely left in the hands of the people, predicted the editor of the New York 
Evening Mirror-in articulating the emerging consensus-it was telegraphy: "It is 
free to all who choose to pay for the use ofit, and thus far has been managed with 
admirable skill and discretion."90 The case for federal control received a further 
blow when, shortly thereafter, several state legislatures, led by New York, passed 
laws to curb the most serious forms of potential abuse. 9 1 
Following the Civil War, champions and critics of telegraph reform would 
endlessly debate the significance of this early experiment in federal control. 
While industry insiders typically dismissed federal control as a bizarre and short-
lived aberration, a few old-timers were candid enough to recall that, at the time, 
they had held a different view. Proposals for the regulation of the telegraph 
industry by the federal government, declared veteran telegrapher George Pres-
cott in 1866, were "unwise, injudicious, and unnecessary." Yet, Prescott added, 
this had not always been his position: 
During the first half of my twenty years' service as a telegraph operator, I was 
strongly of the opinion that it would have been good policy for the govern-
ment to own and control the telegraph lines, and that the public would have 
been greatly benefited thereby. The companies were then small and poor, the 
lines were badly constructed and worse supported; and all progress was pre-
vented by the constant and unremitting competition of rival lines. There was 
no question but that one company could do the telegraphic business over any 
given territory much cheaper and better than two or more. There is a striking 
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analogy in this respect between the telegraph and the mail service, and no one 
will deny that one company can manage this service better than two or more. 
Given the unlimited resources of the federal government, Prescott explained, he 
had taken it for granted that it was the only institution with the requisite means 
to promote the public good. 92 
By 1866, Prescott had changed his mind. Now that Prescott's employer, 
Western Union, had established a dominant position in the American telegraph 
industry, Prescott no longer doubted that a private enterprise could coordinate a 
nationwide network. At approximately the same time, Morse himself reached a 
similar conclusion. Western Union, Morse wrote Kendall in March 1866, was 
"becoming doubtless, a monopoly, but no more so than the post office system, 
and its uni~ is in reality a public advantage if properly and uprightly managed."93 
During the 184os, large numbers of Americans participated in a broad-ranging 
discussion of national communications policy, the first such discussion m Ameri-
can history. Political engagement was high and the command of the issues 
impressive. Though the privatization of the postal system had influential cham-
pions, in the end, Congress buttressed the existing regulatory regime. Indeed, m 
1851 Congress went so far as to authorize improvements m the level of mail 
delivery that were independent of their possible impact on postal finance. In an 
age in which historians have often dismissed governmental institutions as agents 
of change, here was one policy decision that dramatically broadened the man-
date of the federal government. 
In telegraphy, in contrast, deregulation prevailed.94 Notwithstanding the ex-
plicit preference of Morse and the misgivings of a leading segment of the press, 
legislators declined to establish a regulatory regime that was m any way com-
parable to the regulatory regime that had long existed in mail delivery. Even m 
telegraphy, however, deregulation had its limits. The industry remamed con-
strained not only by a congeries of state regulations but also by federal court 
rulings on patent rights, contracts, and eminent domain. Following the Civil 
War, reformers would once again agitate for federal control, catalyzmg a popular 
movement for "postal telegraphy" that, in the early twentieth century, would 
shape the regulatory regime in the telephone industry. 95 
The enactment oflegislation to promote the public welfare is central to what 
the founders of the American republic meant by political republicanism, and is 
among the most important of the legacies of the American Revolution. No_t until 
the 1 84os would a younger generation move beyond the founders and declSlvely 
challenge this shared consensus. For various reasons, these reformers rejected 
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political republicanism and embraced the noninterventionist economic credo 
that has come to be known as economic liberalism. In transportation, banking, 
and telegraphy, federal regulation was almost ritualistically disparaged. For the 
first time in American history, it became common to characterize as private even 
those enterprises that were the most heavily dependent on the public largesse-
such as, for example, the land-grant railroads in the trans-Mississippi West. In the 
process, the now-familiar idealization of private enterprise emerged. It was a 
genuinely new idea, an invented tradition popularized by critics of governmental 
expansion as a reaction to, and critique of, the prior expansion of the early 
American state. In mail delivery, in contrast, a regulatory regime that dated 
back to the I 79os retained enough popular support to endure. Postal deregulation 
was not without its defenders; yet, in the end, this was one market revolution 
that failed. 
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REEVE HUSTON 
Popular Movements and Party Rule 
The New York Anti-Rent Wars and 
the Jacksonian Political Order 
When he arrived in Sand Lake, a village in the foothills of the Tagkhanic 
mountains just east of Albany, Governor William Bouck felt a shock of dismay 
and anger. A crowd was waiting for him. Brightly colored banners and trans-
parencies filled the village square with strange icons, pictures of Indians, and 
mottoes like "Down with the Rent" and "The Land is Mine, Sayeth the Lord." 
As the governor arrived, the celebra·nts began firing a six-pound cannon; be-
tween one and two thousand people crowded around his carriage, "in various 
ways demonstrat[ing] their high respect for their chief magistrate." At the edge 
of the crowd stood a hundred men dressed in pantaloons, calico gowns, and 
painted muslin masks. The men carried "swords, knives, bits of scythes, . .. 
threatening looking cheese knives, ... clubs ... muskets, ... [and] pistols." 1 
The governor had expected his visit to be secret; the crowd's presence meant 
that news of his trip would get back to Albany, exposing him to political attacks 
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